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SIX SUMMARY JUDGMENT SAFEGUARDS 
Edward Brunet
*
 
Summary judgment is under attack.  Critics have called summary 
judgment unconstitutional, overused, a radical rule derived from more 
modest origins, and ineffectual.  One rarely hears anyone willing to 
praise summary judgment.  Existing summary judgment discourse 
appears moody and negative.  Nevertheless, summary judgment provides 
numerous advantages and efficiencies.  Summary judgment helps 
settlement chances by clarifying factual and legal issues and decreasing 
risk.  A denial of the motion creates a settlement premium by increasing 
the costs and risk.  In addition several “safeguards” exist that prevent 
erroneous grants of summary judgment.  These safeguards include (1) 
the discretionary ability of the trial judge to deny summary judgment by 
identifying a single disputed factual issue; (2) robust de novo appellate 
review; and (3) a liberal ability to call a helpful “time-out” available 
under Rule 56(f) to take a focused quantum of discovery essential to 
combat a summary judgment request.  Other potential safeguards, 
including (1) the weighing of inferences favoring the non-movant; (2) 
allowing the non-movant to introduce inadmissible evidence; and (3) a 
“handle with care” label applicable to only selected types of cases, work 
less well. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Summary judgment is under attack.  Respected commentators and 
judges have criticized summary judgment in multiple ways.  Professor 
Thomas argues that summary judgment is unconstitutional because it did 
not exist at common law and violates the historical test set forth textually 
in the Seventh Amendment.
1
  Judge Patricia Wald worries that trial 
judges are too quick to grant summary judgment and that Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56
2
 “has assumed a much larger role in civil case 
dispositions than its traditional image portrays . . . to the point where 
fundamental judgments about the value of trials and especially trials by 
jury may be at stake.”3  Professor Stephen Burbank describes the 
original 1938 Federal Rule 56 as a “radical transformation” of earlier 
versions of a much more confined procedure.
4
  Professor Schneider 
concludes that courts grant a disproportionate number of defendants‟ 
summary judgment requests in cases raising gender discrimination.
5
  
 
 1. Suja A. Thomas, Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (2007) 
(arguing that summary judgment conflicts with the common law axiom that the jury decides the 
facts); Suja A. Thomas. Why Summary Judgment is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professors 
Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1667, 1667 (2008) (attacking articles seeking to defend the 
constitutionality of summary judgment).  “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
VII. 
 2.  Unless otherwise specified, this article refers to the current version of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, effective Dec. 1, 2009. 
 3. Patricia Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1897, 1898 (1998).  
Accord, Richard L. Steagall, The Recent Explosion in Summary Judgments Entered by the Federal 
Courts Has Eliminated the Jury From Political Power, 33 S. ILL. L. REV. 469, 496-99 (2009) 
(setting forth litany of problems caused by overuse of summary judgment). 
 4. Stephen Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:  
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 591, 591 (2004). 
 5. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 760 (2008).  See also, Elizabeth M. Scheider, The Changing 
2
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Professor John Bronsteen delivered the ultimate criticism by strongly 
urging that summary judgment be eliminated and defending this 
revolutionary suggestion by asserting that the progress and settlement of 
civil litigation would be relatively unchanged by his proposal.
6
 
Today‟s summary judgment discourse is moody and negative.  
Rarely is anything positive said about summary judgment.
7
  
Nonetheless, summary judgment advances several important policies.  
Summary adjudication places proof responsibilities upon the parties in 
an efficient “put up or shut up” way.8  This summary judgment burden 
of production insures that only those cases with legitimate disputed 
issues of fact merit a trial and thereby conserves expensive and scarce 
trial and jury resources.  The summary judgment process facilitates the 
identification of the issues in litigation and similarly aids the 
determination of the relevant legal rules to be applied. 
Summary judgment also plays an important role in the desirable 
promotion of settlement.  By focusing the parties‟ attention on the 
quality of the facts and law that supports a claim or defense, the 
availability of summary judgment makes the relevant facts and law less 
asymmetric and creates a more certain assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of a case.
9
  As the issues in a case become less risky, the 
chances of settlement increase. 
Once a motion for summary judgment is made and denied, the 
settlement value for the non-movant generally is enhanced.  This 
dynamic deters frivolous summary judgment motions by placing a risk 
of loss on the moving party.  In a very real sense, the availability of 
summary judgment creates a “summary judgment premium” in a case in 
the form of increased risk of loss that will drive up the cost of settlement 
for the defendant who moves for summary judgment and raise potential 
settlement value for the nonmovant, usually the plaintiff.  The existence 
 
Shape of Federal Pretrial Practice:  The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010). 
 6. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (2007). 
 7. But see David Rosenberg & Randy Kozol, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement 
Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004) (recommending required 
Rule 56 motions to achieve more accurate settlements). 
 8. See Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 385 F.3d 1104, 1111 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(describing summary judgment as a “„put up or shut up‟ moment in a lawsuit, when a party must 
show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.”).  
Accord, Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 9. See EDWARD BRUNET, CHARLES CRAVER, & ELLEN DEASON, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE‟S PERSPECTIVE (3d ed. 2006) (positing that certainty and the 
lessening of risk facilitate settlement). 
3
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of this premium discourages the filing of weak summary judgment 
motions to avoid a summary judgment premium. 
This article sets forth a more optimistic assessment of the current 
status of summary judgment.  Numerous potential safeguards deter 
improper grants of summary judgment motions and serve to temper trial 
judges who are prone to rule favorably on summary judgment requests.  
While some of the safeguards act more as ineffectual clichés or slogans, 
others provide a set of significant deterrents to overly adventuresome 
treatment of Rule 56 motions.  The goal of this article is to critique six 
possible summary judgment safeguards and, in so doing, to determine 
whether the state of contemporary summary judgment is as bleak as 
leading critics describe. 
II.  SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INHERENTLY DISCRETIONARY BECAUSE OF 
THE POWER TO FIND A DISPUTED ISSUE OF FACT 
Summary judgment is inherently discretionary.  Despite the 
restoration of the mandatory “shall grant” language as part of the 2009 
Amendments to Rule 56,
10
 the mechanics of summary judgment retain a 
giant dose of discretion for the trial judge.  A Rule 56 motion must be 
denied if the trial court finds a single issue of disputed fact.  This 
timeworn slogan vests a huge quantum of authority in the hands of a 
judge inclined to deny summary judgment. 
The ease of denying a summary judgment motion through this 
technique is evident from decisions that emphasize the presence of just 
one disputed issue of fact.  For example, in Carerra v. Maurice J. Sopp 
& Son, the court reversed a grant of summary judgment in a wrongful 
death and negligence case brought by pedestrians and their families 
against a truck service center following truck collision with 
pedestrians.
11
  The court held a fact issue existed with regard to 
causation, and stated, “If any triable issue of fact exists, it is error for the 
trial court to grant a party‟s motion for summary judgment.”12  
 
 10. Effective Dec. 1, 2010, FED. R. CIV. PRO. RULE 56(a) will read in relevant part, “The 
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  COMM. ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF CIVIL RULES 26 
AND 56, at Rules Appendix C-6, -9, -25 (May 8, 2009) (Revised June 15, 2009) (hereinafter 2009 
Amendments).  See www.uscourts.gov/rule/newrules6.htm (confirming effective date of December 
1, 2010).  Stephen S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 Akron L. Rev. 1141 (2010). 
 11. 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268 (Ct. App. 3d Div. 2009). 
 12. Id. at 276 (emphasis added).  Accord, Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children‟s 
Found. of L.A. & Ventura Counties, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 208-19 (Ct. App. 3d Div. 2009) 
(reversing summary judgment in suit brought by former employee against former employer under 
4
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Numerous decisions reverse summary judgment and stress the need to 
do so because of the existence of a single issue of contested fact.
13
 
The language of Rule 56 itself provides textual support for the 
presence of a degree of discretion to deny summary judgment.  The Rule 
demonstrates the wide latitude afforded to a trial judge in denying 
summary judgment, including a minimal threshold requirement of 
finding even one disputed issue of material fact.
14
 
Several recent decisions boldly assert that summary judgment is a 
discretionary mechanism.  The Fifth Circuit expansively explains the 
district court‟s ability to deny summary judgment “even if the movant 
otherwise successfully caries its burden of proof if the judge has doubt 
as to the wisdom of terminating the case before trial.”15  Some courts 
appear to base this power upon the broad inherent authority to manage 
trial court pre-trial procedure.
16
 
 
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, holding a genuine issue of material fact existed 
as to whether employer‟s reason for firing pregnant employee was pretextual, and stating, “If . . . we 
find that one or more triable issues of material fact exist, we must reverse the summary judgment.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 13. See, e.g., Hayim Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Action Watercraft Int‟l, Inc., 15 So.3d 724, 
728 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing summary judgment in action for breach of contract, 
fraudulent concealment, and nondisclosure brought by purchaser of commercial real property 
against seller, holding factual issue remained as to whether seller attempted to actively conceal 
known defects, and stating, “If the evidence raises the slightest doubt on any issue of material fact, 
if it is conflicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it tends to prove the issues, it 
should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be determined by it.”); Bond v. Giebel, 787 
N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (App. Div. 2005) (affirming denial of summary judgment in action brought by 
snowmobiler against owner of parked vehicle to recover for injures allegedly sustained during 
collision with vehicle, holding fact issue as to location of owner‟s vehicle at time of accident 
precluded summary judgment, and stating that “to defeat a motion for summary judgment the 
opposing party must show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact.”) (emphasis added; 
internal quotations omitted); Slagle v. Hubbard, 29 P.3d 1195, 1198 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing 
summary judgment in negligence action brought by injured passenger against minor driver and his 
parents, holding genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether drivers acted tortiously when 
they raced along highway, and stating that “there is at least a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning whether [the two minor drivers] acted „in concert‟ with one another as they sped down 
[the highway].”) 
 14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(h), 2009 Amendments, supra note 10, at 
Rules Appendix C-29-30. 
 15. Veillon v. Exploration Servs., Inc., 876 F.2d 1197, 1200 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming trial 
court‟s denial of summary judgment in injury action based on the Jones Act and general maritime 
law). 
 16. See, e.g., Hallwood Plaza, Inc. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 804, 811 (2008) (denying 
motion for summary judgment in action alleging breach of performance and lease agreement, and 
noting that “although summary judgment is designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action, a trial court has the discretion to deny summary judgment if there is 
reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.”) (citation omitted; 
internal quotations omitted); Metric Constr. Co. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 611, 614 (2006) 
(denying summary judgment in construction contract dispute and stating that “even if the court is 
5
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Friedenthal and Gardner assert a clear Rule 56 basis for authority to 
deny summary judgment despite the absence of any disputed issues of 
material fact.
17
  They contend that discretion to deny is consistent with 
the intent of the 1938 original version of the rules and find support in the 
1986 trilogy of summary judgment landmark decisions.
18
  Friedenthal 
and Gardner also base this discretion to deny in the nature of federal 
practice, presumably in the trial judge‟s inherent management powers.19 
I see little in the 1986 trilogy to support such discretion to deny 
summary judgment.
20
  Each of these three Supreme Court decisions 
upheld summary judgment and commentators stress the celebratory 
spirit of the Court regarding the important viability of the summary 
judgment weapon.
21
  These decisions focused on the mechanics of 
summary judgment by clarifying that a directed verdict standard 
governed Rule 56 motions and by forging a trial-like burden shifting 
dynamic that placed a light burden of production upon a movant that 
lacked the burden of proof at trial.
22
  Such mechanical norms have no 
discretionary elements and seem to undercut Friedenthal‟s and Gardner‟s 
thesis that the 1986 trilogy supports their discretion to deny position.
23
 
The alternative authority for discretion to deny advanced by 
Friedenthal and Gardner has merit.  Much of the procedures and 
 
convinced that the moving party is entitled to [summary judgment] the exercise of sound judicial 
discretion may dictate that the motion should be denied, and the case fully developed.”) (quoting 
McLain v. Meier, 612 F.2d 349, 356 (8th Cir. 1979)); U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Skymaster of Va., 
Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 995, 998 (E.D. Va. 2000) (granting summary judgment to aviation insurer in 
dispute concerning pilot‟s misrepresentation of his medical condition to Federal Aviation 
Administration, but noting that a “trial judge has broad discretion to determine whether to deny [a] 
motion for summary judgment.”); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 698 A.2d 
1167, 1179-80 (Md. 1997) (suggesting, in action for declaratory judgment to determine whether a 
comprehensive general liability insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify the insured installer of 
insulation containing asbestos, that a court may deny summary judgment for several reasons, and 
that a court ordinarily possesses “discretion to refuse to pass upon, as well as discretion 
affirmatively to deny, a summary judgment request in favor of a full hearing on the merits; and this 
discretion exists even though the technical requirements for entry of such a judgment have been 
met.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 17. Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment 
in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 94-104 (2002). 
 18. Id.  See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 19. See Friedenthal & Garnder, supra note 17, at 99. 
 20. See supra note 18. 
 21. See, e.g., John E. Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett 
with Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problem under Rule 56, 6 REV. LIT. 227, 228-30 (1987) 
(stating that Celotex “signal[s] a significant change of attitude toward grants of summary 
judgment.”). 
 22. Id. at 231. 
 23. See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 17, at 94-104. 
6
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philosophy of the 1938 passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
smacked of equity and its primary tool, discretion.
24
  The 1938 text was 
premised on a divide between mandatory “shall” rules and discretionary 
“shall” norms.25  Not surprisingly, over time district judges made 
extensive use of their clear and purposeful discretionary powers and 
forged an equity-like “judicial management movement.”26 
III.  “HANDLE WITH CARE” MANTRA:  LEADING CASES CAUTION 
AGAINST GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PARTICULAR TYPES OF 
DISPUTES 
The presence of leading decisions that preach and caution that 
summary judgment must be treated with special care in selected varieties 
of disputes has the potential for discouraging grants of summary 
judgment.  Nonetheless, several problems plague this potential 
safeguard.  First, the “Handle with Care” label lacks any textual support 
in Rule 56.
27
  Second, this canon of summary judgment construction 
flies directly in the face of a transsubstantive interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
28
  Third, a warning or caution to take 
care when considering a summary judgment in a particular type of case 
is not a firm rule capable of certain and clear operation.  Nevertheless, 
numerous decisions announce such a cautionary attitude in negligence, 
antitrust, and civil rights cases.  Using powerful language, many cases 
seem to deny summary judgment on this basis.
29
 
 
 24. See, e.g., Steven Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1989). 
 25. See Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion over Competing Complex 
Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 297-306 (1991). 
 26. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-78 (1982). 
 27. See FED. R. CIV. P. RULE 56; 2009 Amendments, Rules Appendix C-25-30. 
 28. “The Court has usually hewed to a „transsubstantive‟ approach to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, construing and applying them uniformly without regard to the nature of a particular 
claim except where the Rules themselves specifically provide otherwise.”  Harold S. Lewis, Jr., 
Book II. Civil Rights Litigation: Practice and Procedure, in STEPHEN YAGMAN & HAROLD S. 
LEWIS, POLICE MISCONDUCT AND CIVIL RIGHTS: FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 
12-100 (2d ed. 2002). 
 29. See, e.g., Christensen v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 279 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing summary judgment in negligence action brought by injured longshoreman and asserting 
that “summary judgment is rarely granted in negligence cases because the issue of „whether the 
defendant acted reasonably‟ is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact.”) (quoting Martinez v. 
Korea Shipping Corp., 903 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 1990)); Toscano v. Prof‟l Golfers Ass‟n, 258 
F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment in action alleging unlawful restraint of 
trade under the Sherman Act, but noting that “summary judgment is disfavored in complex antitrust 
litigation where motive and intent are important, proof is largely in the hands of the alleged 
conspirators and relevant information is controlled by hostile witnesses.”); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 
7
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A. Handle with Care in Antitrust 
An examination of such a cautionary attitude seems most 
idiosyncratic in antitrust litigation.  After all, the reinstatement of 
summary judgment in Matsushita signaled that use of Rule 56 is both 
appropriate and available in antitrust disputes.
30
  Leading commentators 
in the field of antitrust assert that courts have applied a “remarkably 
expansive” version of summary judgment in the antitrust field.31  The 
influence of Poller v. CBS, once a major impediment to granting a 
summary judgment in an antitrust case,
32
 appeared to be decreased 
substantially by a series of post-Poller decisions.
33
 
We currently live in an era in which the courts appear to support the 
use of summary judgment as a means to dispose of antitrust cases.  I 
have recently asserted that “antitrust summary judgment is alive, 
diverse, and working.”34  Summary judgment‟s availability in antitrust 
litigation is essential because the possibility of obtaining treble damages 
and statutory attorney‟s fees provides an incentive to file potentially 
equivocal claims.
35
  Leading decisions regarding the use of antitrust 
summary judgment emphasize the transsubstantive nature of Rule 56
36
 
 
114 F.3d 1467, 1478 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary judgment in action against insurer under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Sherman Act, and the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and asserting that “complex antitrust cases . . . 
invariably involve complicated issues of causation and damages,” and that the plaintiffs were 
“entitled to survive summary judgment on the issue of antitrust injury”). 
 30. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 31. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND 
EXECUTION (2005). 
 32. 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (using cautionary language regarding summary judgment in 
antitrust conspiracy cases and specifically stating that “summary procedures should be used 
sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is 
largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot”). 
 33. See Edward Brunet, Antitrust Summary Judgment and the Quick Look Approach, 62 SMU 
L. REV. 493, 507-513 (2009) (interpreting Matsushita as adopting the directed verdict test for 
summary judgment, eliminating the old “slightest doubt” standard, and displaying a willingness to 
use summary judgment in a case with a huge record).  I concede that courts occasionally recite the 
Poller dictum as though it were contemporary gospel.  See, e.g., Indus. Burner Sys., Inc. v. Maxon 
Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 878, 882 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (asserting that “summary judgment should be 
used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation.”). 
 34. Brunet, supra note 33, at 513. 
 35. See, e.g., PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST LAWS 79 (Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 2000) (1978)) (describing antitrust as a field in 
which there are “powerful incentives to offer claims or defenses of little merit.”). 
 36. See Robert Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Perspectives on Reading the Rules, 84 YALE 
L.J. 718, 718 (describing the transsubstantive idea as a system of procedural rules “generalized 
across substantive lines”). 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss4/3
8-BRUNET_WESTERN 11/9/2010  1:14 PM 
2010] SIX SUMMARY JUDGMENT SAFEGUARDS 1173 
and demonstrate a summary judgment norm of a generalized, uniform 
nature.
37
 
The post-Matsushita antitrust decisions emphasizing caution appear 
contrary to the spirit and mechanics of the 1986 trilogy.
38
  Yet, the very 
existence of such cases demonstrates a degree of judicial uneasiness with 
granting summary judgment in antitrust litigation.  Several themes 
resonate in these cases.  Courts fear the complexity of disputes having a 
large factual record,
39
 worry about the significance of issues of intent,
40
 
and seem uneasy with questions of credibility that often arise in antitrust 
litigation.
41
 
 
 37. See, e.g., Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F. 2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 
1992) (concluding that the non-movant‟s burden in an antitrust case is no different than in non-
antitrust disputes); Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F. 2d 1483, 1490 (8th Cir. 1992) (asserting 
that in “complex antitrust cases, no different or heightened standard for the grant of summary 
judgment applies”). 
 38. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 40-42. 
 39. See, e.g., Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing 
summary judgment in antitrust action and noting that “because antitrust cases consist of primarily 
factual issues, summary judgment should be used „sparingly.‟”); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 
Inc., 571 F.2d 976, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1975) (reversing dismissal of class action complaint alleging 
antitrust violations on ground that matter was within exclusive jurisdiction of National Labor 
Relations Board). 
[D]ismissal was premature since issues of fact remain[ed] to be resolved, and . . . [e]ven 
where both parties may urge the absence of any material factual issues, [district judges 
have been] counselled (sic) to be cautious, lest haste to avoid a trial lead to premature 
resolution of contested matters . . . particularly in complex antitrust litigation, [where] 
although the benefits of avoiding a trial may be substantial, the courts have stressed the 
inappropriateness of deciding issues of fact before they have been fully developed. 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 40. See, e.g., Toscano v. Prof‟l Golfers Ass‟n, 258 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2001) (calling for 
summary judgment to be used sparingly in antitrust disputes because of presence of intent and 
motive questions); Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 987 (8th Cir. 1982) (reversing summary 
judgment in suit brought by terminated distributor against manufacturer and wholesale dealer 
alleging conspiracy to terminate in violation of the Sherman Act and stating: “Summary judgments 
are somewhat disfavored in antitrust cases, especially when motive or intent is at issue.”); Fontana 
Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1980) (reversing summary 
judgment in suit brought by general aviation aircraft dealer against aircraft manufacturer based on 
alleged violations of Sherman Anti-Trust and Clayton Acts, and stating, “In considering the 
applicability of summary judgment to this case . . . we are not prepared to hold that the record is 
sufficiently clear and developed for us to make a determination one way or the other as to [the 
alleged conspiratorial motive and intent].”). 
 41. See, e.g., Welchlin, D.O. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 366 F. Supp. 2d 338, 351-52 (D.S.C. 
2005) (pointing to a need to try complex antitrust cases to the jury because of the trial court‟s 
inability to weigh evidence when ruling on summary judgment). 
9
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B. Handle with Care in Negligence Litigation 
Courts sometimes articulate a reluctance to grant summary 
judgment in cases involving negligence claims.
42
  This “handle with 
care” philosophy appears premised on the relative expertise of the jury 
and the court.  Courts allocate negligence issues to the jury by reasoning 
that jurors possess special competence to decide matters of carelessness 
or breach of duty of care.
43
  Rather than rely directly upon the Seventh 
Amendment‟s44 historical test,45 this type of rationale focuses on relative 
skill, a division of labor that seemingly allocates decisional authority to 
the trial judge to decide questions of tort policy where consistency and 
complex issues of tort policy are dominant. 
Leading commentators such as Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane 
appear to take a cautionary attitude toward using summary judgment in 
negligence litigation.
46
  They explain that summary judgment “is not 
commonly interposed and even less frequently granted in negligence 
actions.”47  They reason that this development is “not surprising” due to 
the “specialized function” of the judge and jury and the “particular 
deference . . . accorded the jury in such actions.”48  Professor Moore 
takes a similar position, asserting that questions of negligence are 
“ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication either for or against 
the claimant, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.”49  
 
 42. Paraskevaides v. Four Seasons Wash., 292 F.3d 886, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reversing 
summary judgment in suit against a hotel to recover the value of jewelry stolen from a hotel room, 
and holding issue of contributory negligence was a genuine issue of material fact “more 
appropriately resolved by a jury”); Smith v. Selco Prods., Inc., 96 N.C. App. 151, 155-56 (1989) 
(reversing summary judgment in suit brought by injured worker against manufacturer, holding fact 
issue existed as to whether worker was contributorily negligent, and stating summary judgment is 
“rarely appropriate in a negligence case . . . because the determination of essential elements of these 
claims or defenses to these claims are [sic] within the peculiar expertise of the fact-finders”); 
Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1983) (reversing summary 
judgment for oil circuit breaker manufacturer in a negligence action and stating: “In negligence 
cases, questions concerning the reasonableness of the parties‟ conduct, foreseeability and proximate 
cause particularly lend themselves to decision by a jury”). 
 43. See, e.g., Selco Prods., 96 N.C. App. at 155-56. 
 44. See supra note 1. 
 45. See generally Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury 
Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 4 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407 (1995) (setting forth and critiquing the idea that the text of the 
Seventh Amendment requires procedures that were used “at common law.”). 
 46. See 10A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2729 (Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Rafael Miller, & 
Mary Kay Kane, eds., 3d ed. 2010). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. § 56 Civil App. 200, in MOORE‟S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 2006). 
10
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The Supreme Court has endorsed the cautionary approach but only in a 
footnote containing a one-sentence dictum.
50
 
The “handle negligence summary judgment with care” position of 
Moore and Wright, and Miller and Kane, seems inconsistent with the 
presence of multiple negligence decisions granting or affirming 
summary judgment.
51
  Despite the existence of case law urging trial 
judges to be cautious when considering a motion for summary judgment 
in a suit involving claims of negligence, numerous decisions routinely 
grant summary judgment.
52
  An instruction to “use caution” when 
deciding a negligence case on summary judgment is not a rule in the 
form of a mandatory command.  Rather, such a “handle with care” 
designation operates either as a slogan or an exhortation.  The normal 
summary judgment standard applies to negligence and all other types of 
cases.
53
  Provided that no reasonable jury could enter a verdict for the 
nonmoving party, summary judgment should be granted. 
C. Handle with Care in Civil Rights Litigation 
Courts also stress their reluctance to grant motions for summary 
judgment in cases presenting civil rights issues.  Using a “handle with 
care” mantra, leading decisions of several circuits now assert that grants 
of summary judgment should be viewed with caution in civil rights 
claims.
54
  Some opinions that express this position reason that the motive 
 
 50. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 n.12 (1976) (observing in a 
case involving a construction of Rule 14a-9 of the SEC, the task of the jury in applying a 
“reasonable man” norm “is thought ordinarily to preclude summary judgment in negligence cases.”) 
(citing Wright, Miller & Kane, supra note 47). 
 51. See supra notes 47-50. 
 52. See, e.g., Bultema v. United States, 359 F.3d 379, 386 (6th Cir. 2004) (reversing summary 
judgment for defendant in a Federal Tort Claims Act case because of the presence of contradictory 
evidence regarding plaintiff‟s contributory negligence and “it is the fact-finder‟s duty at trial to 
weigh the evidence”); Christensen v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 279 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing summary judgment in negligence action brought by injured longshoreman and asserting 
that “summary judgment is rarely granted in negligence cases because the issue of „whether the 
defendant acted reasonably is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact‟”) (citing Martinez v. Korea 
Shipping Corp., 903 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 53. See supra notes 2, 29, and accompanying text. 
 54. See, e.g., Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming preclusion 
of summary judgment on Rehabilitation Act claim, cautioning that summary judgment should 
seldom be used in employment-discrimination cases, and commenting that “[b]ecause 
discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment 
should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the non-
movant”). 
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issues that recur in civil rights litigation are best decided by a jury that is 
more familiar with such questions than a judge.
55
 
Judge Posner explains his support for using caution in employment 
discrimination summary judgment assessments by characterizing the 
critical issue as involving credibility.
56
  Similarly, Judge Jerome Frank 
pioneered an unwillingness to “pass on the veracity or credibility of 
witnesses” in overturning summary judgment for defendant Cole Porter 
in a copyright infringement suit.
57
 
To be sure, a host of summary judgment decisions expresses 
appropriate opposition to assessing witness credibility when deciding 
summary judgment motions.
58
  However, disinclination to decide 
credibility questions, which occurs in a wide variety of cases and cannot 
be limited to civil rights disputes, fails to constitute a categorical rule.  
Consider Judge Posner‟s assertion in a bankruptcy appeal that 
“credibility issues are to be left to the trier of fact to resolve on the basis 
of oral testimony except in extreme cases”59 exhibits an efficiency voice.  
In “extreme cases” where, in Judge Posner‟s terms, the evidence is 
“ridiculous” or “utterly implausible,”60 a trial court should decide the 
issue by granting summary judgment.  Moreover, it would appear more 
difficult to obtain summary judgment or a motion to dismiss using an 
“utterly implausible” approach than the current “plausibility standard.”61 
Judge Posner‟s thoughts on the “handle with care” approach are 
instructive.  Judge Posner takes a transsubstantive position that there is 
no special rule precluding summary judgment in employment 
 
 55. See, e.g., Allen v. Chi. Transit Auth., 317 F.3d 696, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) 
(stressing the need to leave witness credibility determinations to the jury in a Title VII case and 
reversing, in part, summary judgment). 
 56. Id.  
 57. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 58. See, e.g., Scholastic, Inc. v. Harris, 259 F.3d 73, 87 (7th Cir. 2001) (reversing in part 
summary judgment in a dispute regarding overtime pay, because the trial court‟s refusal to admit 
deposition testimony was “an inappropriate resolution of a witness‟ credibility”); Stewart v. Booker 
T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 850 (11th Cir. 2000) (reversing a grant of summary judgment 
because the district court improperly assessed credibility in an employment discrimination case). 
 59. In re Chavin, 150 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted). 
 60. Id. at 728-29.  Judge Posner‟s use of the word plausible was a full ten years prior to the 
adoption of a new standard of assessing whether a pleading is plausible in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007) (using the word “plausible” or related words such as implausible 
nearly twenty times). 
 61. See generally Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”: An 
Introduction to the Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
12
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discrimination cases that involve intent.
62
  In Wallace v. SMC 
Pneumatics, Inc., Judge Posner stated that “there is not a separate rule of 
civil procedure governing summary judgment in employment 
discrimination cases,” but rather courts should merely “be careful” when 
granting summary judgment in such cases.
63
  This language would 
appear to caution district judges facing summary judgment motions in 
civil rights cases without forging a separate rule unsupported by the text 
of Rule 56.  Judge Posner also noted by analogy that while early 
decisions pronounced antitrust law as a field inapt for summary 
judgment, more recent cases have repudiated that view.
64
 
Posner appears to be warning judges and litigants that 
discrimination cases raise difficult summary judgment questions.  His 
act of raising a cautionary yellow flag relies on a nuanced reading of the 
rules of procedure.  Rather than create a heavy handed interpretation of 
Rule 56, Judge Posner relies on subtle dicta to signal his “handle with 
care” position.65  Judge Posner provided a forthright efficiency rationale 
by asserting that the “drift in many areas of federal litigation toward 
substitute summary judgment for trial” was a byproduct of an expanding 
federal caseload.
66
 
IV.  THE RULE 56(F) TIME-OUT SAFEGUARD 
The presence of the motion by the non-movant for additional time 
to take discovery operates as a request for a time-out from the pending 
summary judgment process.  As currently interpreted the Rule 56(f) 
time-out motion
67
 constitutes a legitimate safeguard that prevents 
premature and potentially erroneous grants of summary judgment. 
 
 62. See Chavin, 150 F.3d at 728-29 (holding that the defendant in a bankruptcy case fits into 
the exceptional “utterly implausible” category where the judge need not defer to the trier of fact to 
resolve the credibility issue). 
 63. 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 1397.  See also Deseriee A. Kennedy, Processing Civil Rights Summary Judgment 
and Consumer Discrimination Claims, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 997-1000 (2004) (calling for a 
strong judicial presence in the administration of antitrust and other similarly complex cases that 
apparently would require a particularized treatment of the Rules in such cases). 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). 
If a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot 
present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) deny the motion; (2) 
order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other 
discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any other just order. 
Id. 
13
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Most circuits assert that the non-movant‟s Rule 56(f) request should 
be readily available and liberally activated.
68
  As aptly stated by one 
decision, “Rule 56(f) is intended to safeguard against judges swinging 
the court‟s summary judgment axe too hastily.”69  Timing the assessment 
of summary judgment in relation to whether the nonmoving party has 
had a fair opportunity to discover facts needed to defeat a Rule 56 
motion constitutes the critical and necessary balance to this safeguard.
70
 
Justice Rehnquist emphasized the significance of Rule 56(f) to 
even-handed and efficient administration of summary judgment in his 
Celotex opinion where he asserted that Rule 56(f) prevents the non-
movant from being “railroaded.”71  In Celotex, Justice Rehnquist 
commented, “Any potential problem with such premature motions can 
be adequately dealt with under Rule 56(f), which allows a summary 
judgment motion to be denied, or the hearing on the motion to be 
continued, if the nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to make 
full discovery.”72  This language is clearly designed to prevent premature 
grants of summary judgment because of its reference to delaying or 
continuing the Rule 56 motion and its notable insistence on “an 
opportunity to make full discovery.”73  Lower courts now refer to 
 
 68. See, e.g., CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F. 3d 402, 420 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding district 
court‟s denial of plaintiff‟s motion for additional discovery was abuse of discretion); Doe v. 
Abington Friends School, 480 F.3d 252, 257 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding district court prematurely 
granted summary judgment without allowing further discovery and stating, 
District courts usually grant properly filed Rule 56(f) motions as a matter of course. . . . 
If discovery is incomplete in any way material to a pending summary judgment motion, 
a district court is justified in not granting the motion. . . . And whatever its decision, it is 
“improper” for a district court to rule on summary judgment without first ruling on a 
pending Rule 56(f) motion. 
Id.  (internal quotations and citations omitted)).  See also Culwell v. City of Fort Worth, 468 F.3d 
868, 871 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding district court abused its discretion by un-filing plaintiffs‟ first 
motion to extend time to respond to defendant‟s summary judgment motion and stating, “[Rule 
56(f) motions] are broadly favored and should be liberally granted.”). 
 69. Resolution Trust Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs., Inc. 22 F.3d 1198, 1203-08 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(holding district court abused its discretion in denying movants‟ third Rule 56(f) motion in response 
to “protracted dawdling” by a “recalcitrant opponent” and stating: “We do not believe it is either 
necessary or desirable for a court to attempt to probe sophisticated issues on an undeveloped 
record”). 
 70. See generally Edward Brunet, The Timing of Summary Judgment, 198 F.R.D. 679 (2001). 
 71. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (footnote omitted). 
 72. Id.  See also Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 558, 565 (2004) (granting 
motion for denial of plaintiffs‟ motions for summary judgment in a suit against the United States 
seeking readjustment of partnership items on a partnership income tax return and noting that a party 
“cannot be deprived of the discovery needed to place at issue material factual questions in 
opposition to the motion [for summary judgment]” because “[t]hat is the safeguard to which Rule 
56(f) is directed”). 
 73. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326. 
14
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summary judgment being proper only after the nonmoving party “has 
had adequate time for discovery.”74 
The strong nature of the Rule 56(f) safeguard can be seen by 
examination of the requirement for the non-movant‟s affidavit as a 
mandatory precondition for a time-out.  The text of Rule 56 clearly 
requires the nonmoving party who seeks a continuance to file an 
affidavit explaining how additional discovery will cause denial of 
summary judgment.
75
  Despite a certain textual need for a non-movant 
affidavit, decisions overlook this formal mandate,
76
 and in so doing, 
signal the liberality of the time-out procedure.  The decisions that 
overlook the need for an affidavit demonstrate a willingness to substitute 
some alternative promise from the non-movant or its counsel that a 
continuance will reveal facts supporting denial of summary judgment.  
 
 74. See, e.g., Nooner v. Norris, 594 F.3d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that non-
movant group of inmates were given an adequate “time to conduct discovery” and affirming grant 
of summary judgment in a 1983 case). 
 75. “If a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot 
present facts essential to justify its opposition . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) (emphasis added). 
 76. See, e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 246 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing district court‟s grant of summary judgment to six defendants in domain name dispute and 
holding that “the purposes of Rule 56(f) were served” despite non-movant‟s failure to file a Rule 
56(f) affidavit, because non-movant explained to the district court, orally and in writing, that more 
discovery was needed); St. Surin v. V.I. Daily News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309, 1314 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(reversing summary judgment in suit against newspaper for defamation of public figure and stating: 
“Although we again emphasize the desirability of full compliance with Rule 56(f), failure to support 
a Rule 56(f) motion by affidavit is not automatically fatal to its consideration.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 n.3 (11th Cir. 1992) (reversing grant of summary 
judgment despite lack of affidavit under Rule 56(f) where non-movant “complied with the Rule‟s 
requirements by expressly bringing to the district court‟s attention . . . that discovery was 
outstanding” and requesting a continuance); Int‟l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally‟s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 
1266-67 (5th Cir. 1991) (reversing summary judgment in action alleging tortious interference by 
competitor against corporate owner of fast food restaurants). 
The proper but not only way of requesting additional time for discovery is for the 
nonmoving party to [submit an affidavit].  The nonmoving party‟s failure to tailor its 
request for additional discovery to fit Rule 56(f)‟s precise measurements does not 
necessarily foreclose the court‟s consideration of the request.  Although the preferred 
procedure is to present an affidavit . . . so long as the nonmoving party indicates to the 
court by some equivalent statement, preferably in writing of its need for additional 
discovery, the nonmoving party is deemed to have invoked the rule. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted).  See also Snook v. Trust Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, N.A., 859 
F.2d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[A] party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not file 
an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to invoke the 
protection of that Rule.”); First Chi. Int‟l v. United Exchange Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1380-81 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988) (choosing “flexible approach” of not requiring an affidavit in order to obtain additional 
time for discovery and to extend time for deciding summary judgment). 
15
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For example, a letter or even an oral statement by counsel to the trial 
court serves the same purpose as a Rule 56(f) affidavit.
77
 
One future problem with the time-out request is its possible overuse 
in the wake of the need to plead “plausible” facts.  Future plaintiffs who 
face motions to dismiss governed by Ashcroft v. Iqbal
78
 are likely to seek 
a similar but unregulated time-out to seek discovery essential to defeat a 
Rule 12(b)(6) request.
79
  Such new and earlier requests might cause a 
similar but later Rule 56(f) request to appear redundant.  The need for a 
time-out at two key early decision stages could cause undesirable 
competition and Rule 56(f) to atrophy. 
V.  THE WEIGH INFERENCES IN FAVOR OF THE NON-MOVANT 
SAFEGUARD 
Many summary judgment decisions emphasize that the trial judge 
should weigh factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
80
  In 
United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
81
 the Supreme Court endorsed this 
summary judgment corollary when it reasoned that “the inferences to be 
drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion.”82  Although this proposition 
may act as a safeguard to prevent unjustified grants of summary 
judgment, its ambiguity and overstated nature prevent its reliability.  
Judge William Schwarzer views the Diebold dicta to be “much broader 
than necessary for the decision” and concludes that it “cannot be 
 
 77. See, e.g., Harrod’s Ltd, 302 F.3d at 246 (permitting an oral statement to suffice); Int’l 
Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1266-67 (allowing a writing to substitute for a formal affidavit). 
 78. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 79. See generally Suzette Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal 
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases,  14 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 65 (2010) (suggesting that courts use narrow and focused discovery to determine 
plausibility at the pleading phase of litigation); Scott Dodson  Federal Pleading and State Pretrial 
Discovery, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 43 (2010) (exploring pre-suit discovery and focused, 
particular efforts to obtain discovery early in litigation in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions). 
 80. See, e.g., Crowe v. County of San Diego, 593 F.3d 841, 862 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
“all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the [non-movant] plaintiffs.”); Galvez v. 
Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008) (asserting that “all reasonable doubts about the facts 
should be resolved in favor of the non-movant.”) (quoting Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 
1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also TLT Const. Corp. v. RI, Inc., 484 F.3d 130, 138 (1st Cir. 
2007) (reversing summary judgment in a contract dispute because trial judge did not properly weigh 
inferences in favor of the non-movant). 
 81. 369 U.S. 654 (1962). 
 82. Id. at 655. 
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accepted uncritically.”83  In truth, the maxim that the trial judge should 
weigh inferences in favor of the non-movant is easy to assert but, in 
practice, difficult to implement effectively. 
Several problems plague this possible summary judgment 
safeguard.  First, the singling out of inferences is problematic.  
Influential judges have asserted that “all evidence is inferential.”84  This 
would appear to make this axiom unworkable.  Professor Duane has 
persuasively argued that there is no distinction between inferences and 
testimony.
85
  Confusion over the very meaning of this concept prevents 
it effectiveness.
86
 
Second, this alleged “safeguard” is easy to say but difficult to carry 
out.  This generalization has been made redundant by use of the directed 
verdict standard that now governs the entirely appropriate adage that 
judges should not weigh evidence when assessing summary judgment 
mechanics.
87
  A trial judge worried about improperly weighing the 
evidence, a process left to the jury, may not be keen to weigh inferences 
in favor of the party moved against, but should grant summary judgment 
whenever a reasonable jury could not find for the non-movant. 
Moreover, the process of weighing inferences is a tricky concept in 
summary judgment.  Before such weighing can occur, the court must be 
certain that a choice of inferences actually exists.
88
  When the evidence 
is so one-sided that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving 
party, there is no legitimate choice of inferences and the alleged 
safeguard to weigh inferences in favor of the non-movant fails to 
apply.
89
 
The act of tilting inference weighing appears to be less of a rule of 
law and more of a difficult-to-apply procedure that is hemmed in by 
more powerful summary judgment norms.  As aptly articulated by the 
First Circuit, such inference weighing is an “indulgence . . . bounded by 
the party‟s obligation to support the alleged factual controversy with 
 
 83. William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine 
Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 478 (1984). 
 84. See, e.g., In re Chavin, 150 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.). 
 85. See James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths about Summary Judgment, 52 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1523, 1562-76 (1995). 
 86. See generally id. 
 87. See EDWARD BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, § 6.5 SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE 153-58 (3d ed. 2006). 
 88. See, e.g., Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 883 F. Supp. 534, 537 (D. Ore. 
1995). 
 89. See id. 
17
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evidence that is neither „conjectural nor problematic.‟”90  We are sure to 
see this homily often but unlikely to consider it a legitimate summary 
judgment safeguard. 
VI.  DE NOVO APPELLATE REVIEW PROVIDES A MODERATE SAFEGUARD 
Hands-on de novo review of summary judgment grants provides a 
safeguard of moderate strength.
91
  Every federal circuit purports to 
review grants of summary judgment using a robust scope of de novo 
review.
92
  The certainty of second look at a trial court summary 
judgment operates to curb overenthusiastic use of Rule 56 and represents 
a significant force to correct trial level errors in summary judgment 
mechanics.
93
  De novo review operates as a helpful deterrent to 
erroneous summary judgment decisions “in the wings” of the operational 
market for the production of summary judgment just as a potential 
competitor at the edge of a competitive market can play a helpful role to 
preserve competition.
94
  This deterrence effect operates silently and 
without citation; every trial judge knows that she can be reversed for 
granting summary judgment far more readily than when denying a Rule 
56 request. 
For the most part, analysis of purported de novo review reveals a 
detailed evaluation of the summary judgment record and an appropriate 
non-deferential review of the trial judge‟s ruling.95  However, the 
considerable expense demanded by the hands-on nature of de novo 
review diminishes the potential breadth of this safeguard.  Relatively 
 
 90. Chiang v. Verizon New England, Inc., 595 F.3d 25.34 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting, in part, 
Nat‟l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
 91. “Under this standard of review the reviewing court will analyze the evidence and only 
permit summary judgment to be affirmed where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 87, at 447.  
 92. See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary 
Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 112 (2002) (stating: “The law 
is well-settled that an appellate court will review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de 
novo”). 
 93. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 87, at 447. 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) (adopting a rational 
beer merchant test to determine if Falstaff Brewing was really perceived as a competitive influence 
at the edge of a geographic market); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) 
(concluding that attempted acquisition of Pacific, a firm at the edge of the California natural gas 
market, made Pacific a competitive factor and led court to find a violation of the antitrust laws). 
 95. Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., LLC, 575 F.3d 145, 152 (1st Cir. 2009) (reversing 
summary judgment in action brought by employee against former employer and manager under 
state anti-discrimination statute and stating: “This court‟s review of the district court‟s grant of 
summary judgment is de novo and not deferential.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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few cases are reversed following de novo review.
96
  For this idea to 
thrive as a safeguard, the deterrence concept set forth above needs to 
work its magic. 
Moreover, the empirical support for relying on this safeguard 
appears shaky.  The high cost of appeals and the difficulty of obtaining 
reversal mean that relatively few cases will get appealed.  Modest 
quantities of summary judgment appeals suggest that the reported case 
law fails to reflect a representative set of issues.  The few reported 
appellate opinions constitute the proverbial tip of the iceberg and are 
unreliable predictors.  Although a Federal Judicial Center study of 
Second and Ninth Circuit appeals in civil cases reveals a 19 percent 
reversal rate for grants of summary judgment and a 15 percent reversal 
rate for all civil cases, this difference was not deemed significant and the 
overall rates termed comparable.
97
 
Several decisions warn that the appellate court will not “mine the 
record” in search of issues of fact for trial.98  Such statements represent 
admonitions to counsel‟s duty to provide proper citations to the record 
and should not be considered unwillingness to provide de novo judicial 
review.  De novo review fails to relieve counsel of its obligations to 
direct the factual disputes to the attention of the court of appeals. 
VII. CUTTING EVIDENTIARY SLACK TO THE UNDERDOG BY ALLOWING 
THE NON-MOVANT TO INTRODUCE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
In an ambiguous and potentially misleading passage of Celotex v. 
Catrett, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the non-movant‟s evidence need 
not be in admissible form.
99
  Although this broad statement appears to be 
dicta, the evidence advanced by the non-movant plaintiff Catrett 
included a letter written by, Mr. J.R. Hoff, the Assistant Secretary of 
Anning-Johnson, Catrett‟s former employer, confirming that Catrett was 
exposed to the Celotex product Firebar during his period of 
 
 96. BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 87, at 451.  “[A] collection of information analyzed by the 
Federal Judicial Center concludes that „a perception that summary judgments are reversed at a 
higher rate than decisions in other civil cases does not appear to be supported by the available 
data.‟”  Id. 
 97. See Joseph Cecil, Trends in Summary Judgment Practice: A Summary of Findings, 1 FJC 
DIRECTIONS 11, 15 (1991) (analyzing 1987 to 1989 data). 
 98. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Des Moines Area Community College, 495 F.3d 906, 915 (8th Cir. 
2007) (asserting that, according to circuit “standard practice,” courts of appeals will not mine the 
record looking for nuggets of factual disputes and affirming summary judgment in a race 
discrimination and retaliation case brought by former provost of college). 
 99. 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (“We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce 
evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.”). 
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employment.
100
  This letter was hearsay at the summary judgment stage, 
but was fully capable of later upgrading in admissibility status at trial.
101
  
The ultimate denial of summary judgment in Celotex by the D.C. Circuit 
relied on this theory with Judge Robert Bork asserting that the Hoff 
letter could not be considered in the summary judgment record because 
it amounts to hearsay.
102
 
Of course, there is no FRCP textual support for the cutting of 
evidentiary slack to a summary judgment non-movant.  Nevertheless, 
some decisions liberally follow Justice Rehnquist‟s proposition despite 
Rule 56(e)‟s requirement that affidavits meet admissibility standards.103  
The key word in Justice Rehnquist‟s potential evidentiary safeguard is 
“form.”104  The word “form” provides an opportunity to preserve a 
definitive ruling on admissibility of the non-movant‟s materials and 
essentially permits the trial judge to predict whether the proffered 
evidence can become admissible by the time of trial.
105
 
While it is possible to argue that the majority intended to generally 
exempt the non-movant‟s proof from admissibility, it seems unlikely 
that Justice Rehnquist desired a broad exemption from the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.  Professor John Kennedy‟s assertion that “Justice 
Rehnquist still meant to say that in any event the content must be 
admissible” rings true.106  Essentially this is a form-content theory with 
the non-moving party able to advance evidence in inadmissible form 
provided that the content of the summary judgment be capable of 
admission later at trial. 
 
 100. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 35, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d sub 
nom., Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 101. Id. at 37 (considering the Hoff letter despite admissibility problems). 
 102. Id. at 42 (Bork, J., dissenting). 
 103. See, e.g., Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 
2006) (permitting the non-movant to submit affidavits containing hearsay “on the theory that the 
evidence may ultimately be presented at trial in an admissible form.”); Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst 
Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a non-movant “need not tender evidence in 
a form that would be admissible at trial,” but qualifying this assertion by stating that “of course, the 
evidence set forth must be of a kind admissible at trial”); McMillan v. W. E. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 
1584 (11th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 520 U.S. 781 (1997) (noting that Celotex was “simply allowing 
otherwise admissible evidence to be submitted in inadmissible form at the summary judgment stage, 
though at trial it must be submitted in admissible form” and insisting on some proof that hearsay 
would be capable of admission by trial).  Contra Johnson v. Weld County, Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 
1210 (10th Cir. 2010) (reading Rehnquist dicta as still requiring rejection of hearsay evidence 
advanced by the nonmovant and affirming summary judgment for defendant in a workplace 
discrimination case). 
 104. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.  See supra note 95. 
 105. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 87, at 225-27. 
 106.  Kennedy, supra note 21, at 239. 
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Some decisions appropriately reject the non-movant‟s proof as 
inadmissible because it appears incapable of becoming admissible later 
at trial.
107
  Consider Judge Posner‟s refusal to consider a hearsay 
statement advanced by the non-movant in Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp.
108
  
The hearsay evidence offered was an article from the Chicago 
Tribune.
109
  Judge Posner stated that because the article was not being 
attested, and that plaintiffs could easily have obtained the reporter‟s 
affidavit, it was not admissible in summary judgment proceedings
110
 to 
identify the affiant and failed to list the affiant in a pre-trial list of 
witnesses. 
Other decisions generally mandate all summary judgment evidence 
to be of the type admissible at trial.
111
  These decisions advance a clear 
and sensible policy of basing summary judgment dispositions upon 
trustworthy and reliable evidence and, for these reasons, merit praise. 
Several decisions seem to consider inadmissible evidence of the 
non-movant without any analysis of its capability of admission into 
evidence at trial.  For example, in Bushman v. Halm,
112
 the court 
asserted that the nonmoving party “is not obligated to produce rebuttal 
evidence which would be admissible at trial” and considered a doctor‟s 
report in ruling on summary judgment.
113
  While these decisions aid the 
non-movant, they interject unreliability into the summary judgment 
process and seem beyond the analysis advanced in Celotex.
114
  While 
Justice Rehnquist‟s dictum appears to lack support in the text, its spirit 
 
 107. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 742. 
 110. Id.  See also Hardrick v. City of Bolingbrook, 522 F.3d 758, 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(reversing summary judgment in a civil rights claim involving alleged use of unreasonable force and 
rejecting district court finding that non-movant‟s answers to interrogatories were hearsay); Cooper-
Schut v. Visteon Auto. Sys., 361 U.S. 421, 429 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment for 
defendant former employer in a Title VII class brought by a former employee and rejecting affidavit 
proof proffered by the non-movant plaintiff because proof of non-movant failed to meet Rule 56(e)). 
 111. See, e.g., Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir. 
2006) (concluding that the materials opposing summary judgment must be those that would be 
admissible at trial); Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 723 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting non-
movant‟s testimony as speculative and vague and concluding that “inadmissible evidence obtained 
in discovery cannot be used to defeat” summary judgment); Ambrose v. New England Ass‟n of 
Schools & Colleges, Inc., 252 F.3d 488, 497 (1st Cir. 2001) (asserting that “[w]arding off summary 
judgment requires non-movants to provide materials of evidentiary quality”). 
 112. 798 F.2d 651, 654-56 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 113. Id.  Accord, O-So Detroit v. Home Ins. Co., 973 F. 2d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(considering affidavit of the non-movant without analysis of its admissibility at trial). 
 114. See supra notes 19, 22, 72-74, 95-96, 99-100 and accompanying text. 
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supports admitting only that evidence that would meet admissibility 
rules.
115
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION:  RE-EVALUATING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SAFEGUARDS 
This article looks at summary judgment in a positive manner.  
Summary judgment, when appropriately applied, is plainly constitutional 
and patently efficient in its ability to conserve scarce jury and judicial 
resources.  The availability of summary judgment helps to define the 
facts and to focus the disputed factual issues.  Such clarification of facts 
and law makes the case‟s outcome more probable, a dynamic that 
enhances settlement prospects by increasing certainty.  At the same time, 
the existence of a settlement premium may up the ante for the non-
movant because the denial of a summary judgment motion increases the 
risk of loss for the movant and puts the non-movant one step closer to an 
expensive trial process.  The existence of the settlement premium deters 
the filing of questionable or frivolous Rule 56 motions and means that a 
motion should not be filed without a reasonable chance of success.  
Nevertheless, summary judgment is capable of misuse and 
misapplication.  Several so-called safeguards facilitate fair and even-
handed application of summary judgment and serve to decrease 
erroneous grants of summary judgment. 
This article evaluates six possible summary judgment “safeguards.”  
I conclude that several possible safeguards are effective at deterring 
misuse of Rule 56 motions.  The trial judge‟s inherent ability to find just 
one genuine issue of disputed fact operates as a delegation of discretion 
to deny summary judgment.  This ability constitutes a significant 
safeguard and plays a starring role in denials of summary judgment. 
In contrast, the admonition to use caution when assessing possible 
summary judgment in selected types of cases—antitrust, negligence, 
civil rights, or employment discrimination—appears to be more of a 
“handle with care” slogan than a rule.  In the hands of a judge who 
subscribes to this idea, the “be careful” admonition might prevent some 
improper applications of summary judgment.  However, this is a “handle 
with care” or “fragile” label that can be affixed to a case and then fully 
ignored.  The handle with care idea “is what it is”—more of a warning 
than a binding rule of law and, like most warnings, fully capable of 
disregard. 
 
 115. See supra notes 72-74. 
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The call for a “time-out” request by the non-movant is a more 
effective safeguard.  It appears to be liberally granted and is readily 
available and operates in a manner to deter wrongful grants of summary 
judgment.  This time-out procedure appropriately permits focused 
discovery to play a role in the summary judgment process and deters the 
possible movant tactic of a premature Rule 56 filing, before the non-
movant has had the opportunity to discover critical facts.  However, a 
future problem with the time-out request is that plaintiffs who face 
motions to dismiss governed by Ashcroft v. Iqbal
116
 are likely to seek a 
similar but unregulated time-out to seek discovery.
117
  Such motions 
might cause a similar Rule 56(f) request to appear redundant and to 
atrophy. 
The axiom that courts weigh inferences in favor of the non-movant 
is easy to say but difficult to apply with certainty.  Some say that all 
evidence is inferential, making it problematic to apply the notion.  
Moreover, this axiom has been made redundant by use of the directed 
verdict standard that now governs summary judgment mechanics.  A 
court may weigh inferences in favor of the party moved against but 
should grant summary judgment whenever a reasonable jury could not 
find for the non-movant.  Put simply, the notion of inference weighing 
appears to be trumped by other more substantial tenets governing 
summary judgment. 
The use of de novo review supplies a useful deterrent to judges on 
the edge of granting a Rule 56 motion.  The existing quantum of serious 
review deters careless grants of summary judgment.  In this way, robust 
appellate review is a safeguard of some value as a way to mitigate 
excessive and wayward grants of summary judgment by trial courts.  
Nonetheless, the high cost of appeal and the long odds at achieving a 
reversal combine to diminish the admitted value of de novo review. 
Lastly, Justice Rehnquist‟s infamous and cryptic dictum in Celotex 
to exempt the non-movant from compliance with the Rules of Evidence 
plays a minimum role as a safeguard.  The dictum suffers from a failure 
of authority and requires the district judge to predict whether an 
inadmissible piece of evidence can become admissible by trial.  This 
crystal ball assessment is difficult to apply and corrupts a summary 
judgment process that needs accuracy and legitimacy, and that is 
advanced by the use of firm evidence norms. 
 
 116. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 117. See, e.g., Malveaux, supra note 79. 
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We are left with a helpful but short list of summary judgment 
“safeguards.”  Legitimate aids exist to aid the trial court to assess and 
deny summary judgment.  These include (1) the inherent and 
discretionary ability to find one issue of disputed fact, (2) robust de novo 
review, and (3) the Rule 56(f) request for a time-out pending discovery.  
I exclude some potentially attractive summary judgment clichés and 
maxims: (1) weighing inferences in favor  of the non-moving party, (2) 
platitudes that motions for summary judgment be handled with care in 
civil rights, antitrust, and negligence litigation, and (3) the Celotex 
dictum that seemingly permits the non-movant to offer inadmissible 
evidence when combating a summary judgment motion.  The latter three 
concepts each can play a role in assessing Rule 56 requests but should 
not be considered reliable safeguards capable of deterring misuse of 
summary judgment. 
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